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Introduction
In his foreword to Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service’s review of the fire response 
to the Buncefield oil depot incident, CFO Roy 
Wilsher noted that:
“... it presented a significant challenge for 
everyone involved, not only on a personal 
level but as a national logistical challenge 
never before faced by the UK fire and rescue 
service.”
As the sometimes lengthy single and multi-
agency debriefs and regulatory reports have 
been compiled and published, a series of 
recommendations have been made in an 
attempt to ensure that a similar incident can 
never happen again.  However, some of those 
recommendations for improving the fire and 
rescue service’s preparedness for incidents 
requiring a bulk foam attack involve 
significant capital budget allocations based 
on a clear and robust understanding of local 
risk and now, approaching five years since 
Buncefield, some of these improvements are 
still being implemented.
Worst case credible scenarios’
The final report of the Buncefield 
Standards Task Group (BSTG) – Safety and 
environmental standards for fuel storage 
sites  – was published in 2007 and has since 
been superseded by the final report of the 
Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG) 
published in December 2009.   While there 
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was a general assumption that before 2005 
planning scenarios generally consisted of an 
incident involving the largest single tank in 
a given fire and rescue service’s operational 
area, the experience of Buncefield clearly 
demonstrated that this is no longer a valid 
scenario on which to plan.  Therefore, the 
PSLG final report makes reference to new 
and vastly increased ‘worst case planning 
scenarios’ in the following terms:
“Planning should consider the scenario of a 
multiple tank fire following an explosion.” 
(PSLG Final Report, pp 216, para. 13)
This recommendation provides us with an 
interesting issue.  While it can certainly be 
accepted that (depending on the local risk 
profile) planning for an individual tank fire 
is no longer a valid planning assumption, 
the new recommendation of ‘multiple tank 
fires’ provides a huge range of scale between 
‘more than one’ and ‘lots’.  So where does 
that sliding scale come to rest?  The ten-
step process (see Annex 1) recommended 
in the Energy Institute’s Model Code of 
Safe Practice Part 19: Fire precautions 
at petroleum refineries and bulk storage 
installation  –  and itself recommended as 
‘relevant good practice’ in the PSLG’s final 
report with which operators “... should comply 
fully” (PSLG, pp 217, para. 22) –  takes the 
‘worst case credible scenario’ one stage 
further by using the ‘worst case scenario for 
the fire event’ as the basis for contingency 
planning.  This is a subtle but important 
difference as the impact it has on both 
local fires and rescue services and operators 
in terms of degrees of preparedness could 
be huge.  In fact, the IP-19 report goes on 
to define the ‘worst case scenario’ for fuel 
depots as:
“... either the largest tank in a single bund, or 
the largest group of tanks in a single bund.”
   ... it presented a significant challenge for everyone 
involved, not only on a personal level but as a 
national logistical challenge never before faced 
by the UK fire and rescue service.
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The IP-19 ‘ten-step process’
The recommendations and actions in the 
PSLG final report (including the ‘ten-step’ 
process to determine the worst case scenarios 
for fire events) are aimed at the operators 
of sites subject to the Control of Major 
Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 
1999 (as amended) and, in particular, at 
all establishments storing large volumes of 
gasoline and other substances capable of 
giving rise to a large flammable gas cloud in 
the event of a loss of primary containment.  
However, it also provides an effective model 
against which local authority fire and 
rescue services (FRSs) may assess their own 
preparedness to address their local risk profile 
established through their integrated risk 
management planning process.
In balancing the preparedness of both 
operators and local authority FRSs, it 
is interesting to compare the different 
sections of relevant legislation (see Box 
1).  While operators have duties under the 
COMAH Regulations ,  which are effectively 
supplemented by the recommendations 
of the PSLG final report, the local fire and 
rescue authority has statutory duties under 
Section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 
2004 in respect of making provision for the 
extinction of fire within its area.  Nowhere in 
that Act does it exclude fires at sites falling 
within the remit of the COMAH Regulations 
(unless these are taken to fall outside the 
definition of ‘normal circumstances’), and yet 
the regulations clearly place a requirement 
on operators to maintain safety equipment 
and resources – including firefighting 
equipment – to deal with the ‘worst case 
credible scenario’.  Indeed, step 5 of the ten-
step process recommends that:
EXTRACTS FROM RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (Ch. 21)
Part 2 - Function of fire and rescue authorities - Core functions
7. Firefighting
 (1) A fire and rescue authority must make provision for the purpose of:
  (a) extinguishing fires in its area, and
  (b) protecting life and property in the event of fires in its area ...
[Explanatory note: Section 7 re-enacts (from the Fire Services Act 1947) the existing 
statutory duty for a fire and rescue authority to plan and provide arrangements for 
fighting fires and protecting life and property from fires within its areas.  A fire and 
rescue authority is required to secure the provision of sufficient personnel, services and 
equipment to deal with all normal circumstances as well as adequate training.]
Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended)
reg. 9(1) - On-site emergency plan
“Every operator of an establishment shall prepare an emergency plan (in these 
regulations referred to as an ‘on-site emergency plan’) which shall be adequate for 
securing the objectives in Part 1 of Schedule 5 and shall contain the information 
specified in part 2 of that schedule.”
Schedule 5, part 2 - Information to be included in on-site emergency plan.
The information referred to in regulation 9(1) is as follows:
3. For foreseeable conditions or events which could be significant in bringing about 
a major accident, a description of the action which should be taken to control the 
conditions or events and to limit their consequences, including a description of the safety 
equipment and the resources available ...
 Explanatory note: This is the principal component of the on-site emergency plan  
 and  should include:
  (a) the types of foreseeable accidents to people or the environment;
  (b) the intended strategy for dealing with these accidents;
  (c) details of the personnel who have roles to play in the emergency response,  
       and their responsibilities;
  (d) details of the availability of function of special emergency equipment  
     including firefighting materials, and damage control and repair teams; and
  (e) details of the availability and function of other resources.
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“Ideally operators should have the means and 
quantity of foam on site to cope with a fire 
in the largest bund immediately.” (PSLG Final 
Report, pp 218, para. 28)
Further, Annex D of IP-19 recognises that 
local authority FRSs are not generally 
equipped to deal with fires in large fuel 
storage tanks and that the operators have 
a clear role in the provision of suitably 
trained and equipped industrial response 
teams experienced in the complexities of 
such incidents (see Box 2), just as they did at 
Buncefield.
EXTRACTS FROM MODEL CODE OF SAFE PRACTICE PART 19:  
FIRE PRECAUTIONS AT PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND BULK STOR-
AGE INSTALLATIONS
Annex D: Typical application rates
(vi) Fire and rescue services response issues
Taking these factors into account, it is considered that the unofficial role of FRSs during 
major fire incidents is to respond and provided trained and disciplined personnel for hose 
deployment, water and foam monitor deployment and foam supply.
There is therefore a clear need to ensure that a competent industry response team will 
mobilise the major resources required and provide the guidance and expertise to FRSs to 
deal with the incident, if necessary.
What is clear is that the best state of 
preparedness comes from the pro-active 
partnership approach between local authority 
FRSs and the operators themselves when 
planning for potential fire scenarios. But 
if the recommendations of the PSLG final 
report are to be implemented completely this 
will, inevitably, cost significant amounts of 
money in terms of additional foam stocks, 
equipment and training once the increased 
worst case credible scenarios are realistically 
analysed.
So, for stocks of foam at industrial sites, the 
big question will naturally be –  
“How much is enough?”.
In the case of Avon Fire & Rescue Service, the 
ten-step process has been effectively used 
to develop a comprehensive understanding 
of worst case credible scenarios in the 
industrial port of Avonmouth.  Taking the 
recommendations of the PSLG report, the 
logistical requirements for a major foam 
attack on the single largest fuel storage tank 
in the Avonmouth area, the group of tanks in 
the largest single bund and a full surface fire 
in the largest bund have all been calculated 
and represent significant increases over and 
above the foam stocks currently maintained 
by both the local authority FRS and the 
operators themselves (see Table 1).  The work 
has also involved detailed calculations of 
water flow rates and pressures to be pumped 
from the nearest inexhaustible supply at the 
Eastern Arm of Avonmouth Docks (Fig. 3).  
Again, this took into account the learning 
from the Buncefield incident and assumed 
that any on-site emergency water supplies 
may not be available following the  
initiating event. 
Fig. 1 - Exercise Gillette, Avonmouth Docks (14 September 2009)
Foam attack
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Fig. 2 - Foam monitor trials during Exercise Gillette 
Fusion, Avonmouth Docks (15 November 2009)
Table 1: Summary of water and foam requirements for the IP-19 'worst case scenarios for fire events' in the Avonmouth area
   What is clear is that 
the best state of 
preparedness comes 
from the pro-active 
partnership  
approach Scenario A: Largest full-
surface tank fire
 
Scenario B: Largest full-
surface bund fire
 
Scenario C: Simultaneous 
full-surface tank fires 
within the largest bund
Total surface area (full-surface tank fire / bund) (m2) 855.5 / 0 0 / 6 498 2 567 / 6 498
Total quantity of foam solution required (litres) 533 832 1 559 520 3 161 016 
Total amount of foam concentrate required 
(3% induction, litres)
19 218 56 143 113 796
Total amount of water required for foam production 
(litres)
514 614 1 503 377 3 047 219
Total cooling water required (litres) 3 056 573 13 754 578 13 754 578
Total water requirement (litres) 3.571 million 15.3 million 16.8 million
Water flow rate for foam attack (l/min) 8 577 25 056 50 787
Water flow rate for cooling (l/min) 12 736 57 311 57 310
Total water flow rate (l/min) 21 313 82 367 108 097
Total liquid (water + foam concentrate) 
required (l/min)
21 633 83 303 109 993
Angus bipod foam monitors (FC27B) 
@ 7 bar.g required
4 10 19
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The work undertaken to analyse the realistic 
requirements for mounting a major foam 
attack in Avonmouth also addressed a series 
of practical issues including:
•	assessment of fire appliance pump 
performance to confirm that they are 
capable of pumping at pressures in 
the region of 10 bar over at least a 65 
minute fire attack time without any 
adverse mechanical effects  
(for example, overheating);
•	the supply of water required to 
undertake the foam attack, with 
options developed using both National 
Resilience High Volume Pumps (HVPs) 
and standard fire service appliances  
(see Figs. 2 and 3);
•	the effect of the use of salt water on 
foam production and quality ;
•	the foam compound stocks required  
and methods for transportation  
and induction;
•	the monitors and pressures required to 
achieve the necessary throw in order 
to project the finished foam onto 
the ignited surface of a fuel tank fire 
while ensuring that all operations are 
conducted at a suitable distance outside 
the bund wall in order to maintain 
firefighter safety;
•	an analysis of the prevailing 
meteorological conditions in 
Avonmouth, including wind directions 
and strength; and
Fig. 3: Detailed planning and practical exercising has resulted in several water supply plans for 'worst case credible scenarios' in the Avonmouth area. 
•	detailed analysis of friction losses 
over extended HVP and conventional 
hose line runs to ensure that adequate 
pressures are provided at the monitors 
themselves to achieve the throws 
required.
During the autumn of 2009, these theoretical 
considerations were tested in a series 
of modular exercises to be able to offer 
corporate assurance that the plan would 
actually work in practice (Figs. 1 and 2).
Foam attack
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Annex 1: ‘Ten-step process’ drawn from Model 
Code of Safe Practice Part 19: Fire precautions 
at petroleum refineries and bulk storage instal-
lations and recommended in safety and environ-
mental standards for fuel storage sites - Process 
Safety Leadership Group final report
Step 1: Determine the worst-case scenario for the fire event.  For fuel 
depots this is considered to be either the largest tank in a single bund, or 
the largest group of tanks in a single bund.  If the plan adequately covers 
the resources for the worst-case scenario, it can be considered capable 
of dealing with lesser similar events, eg fires in smaller tanks etc.  (EI 19 
sections 2.5–2.7, section 3.2.)
Step 2: Assume a full surface tank fire and bund fire.
Step 3: Determine the radiant heat hazard ranges using appropriate 
consequence modelling (and including weather factors) to determine 
safe locations for the firefighting resources deployme nt. (EI 19 section 
2.6.)  This also determines the size of monitor necessary to achieve the 
required throw to reach the tank roof.  The actual distance from the 
monitor to the involved tank only depends on the effective reach of the 
monitor used. It is important to determine the wind direction because 
the monitor should be placed to allow the wind to carry the foam to the 
fire.  Changes in wind direction will have to be accommodated in the 
plan.  Fire monitor performance is available from the manufacturer, but 
be aware the figures quoted will relate to best performance.  Operators 
should base their plan on perhaps 20% reduction in performance to 
counter this, and then test it appropriately to prove the effectiveness.
Step 4: Determine the amount of foam concentrate and water necessary 
to firefight the worst case scenario. (EI 19 Annex D.)
Step 5: Assess whether the necessary foam stocks are available on site. 
If not, consider how quickly these stocks can be brought to the site and 
by whom – what arrangements have been made with the fire and rescue 
service, foam manufacturers and/or neighbouring sites.  Ideally operators 
should have the means and quantity of foam on site to cope with a fire 
in the largest bund immediately.  Operators will also need to consider 
how foam stocks can be transported around the site.
Step 6: Is the water supply sufficient in terms of quantity, pressure and 
flow rate? (EI 19 Annex D6.)  The pressure required is back-calculated 
starting at the monitor.  Most monitors require 7 to 9 bar, then add in 
the frictional losses from the monitor to the pumps.  Operators need 
to remember that the system demands will not just be at the monitors; 
water drawn from any fixed system applications and cooling streams will 
also need to be considered.  It is important to determine the required 
volumes and pressures used.  Dynamic system demand testing will provide 
the evidence
that the system can deliver the required resources.
Step 7: If High Volume Pumps or High Pressure Pumps are necessary to 
achieve the required water capacities, where will these be provided from 
and how long will they take to arrive and be set up?  The possibilities 
include fixed firewater pumps at the site, mobile firewater pumps 
purchased by the site, pre-arranged mutual aid from other nearby 
facilities or the fire and rescue service.  All resources will need to be 
considered in the plan so they can be logistically arranged for relay 
pumping purposes.  Remember to build in redundancy to cover for the 
nearest resources being already in use or in repair, for example.
Step 8: What means are there for delivering the required foam/water 
to the fire?  How many and what size monitors are necessary?  This is 
determined by the area at risk and the application rates required to 
secure and extinguish this risk.  Remember the need for compatibility 
where hardware is brought from a variety of sources.
Step 9: How much and what size and pressure rating of hose is required? 
Where will this quantity of hose be obtained from?  The size and quantity 
of hose required on the flow rate, pressure and distance from the water 
supply.  The greater the flow rate, pressure or distance from the water 
supply, the larger the diameter and pressure rating of the hose needed.
Step 10:  How will any firewater run-off be dealt with?  Hose and 
pumps will be necessary to transfer firewater run-off from the bund to 
another bund or catchment area.  Alternatives include purpose-built 
bund overflows to a remote tertiary containment system, or increasing 
the capacity of an existing bund.  Transfer could be by pumps or via 
gravity flow.
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Next steps
With the completion of the calculations 
which now form the basis of our contingency 
planning and having tested the practicalities 
in a series of exercises, Avon Fire & Rescue 
Service is now moving to the procurement 
stage which will see a significant uplift in the 
foam stocks held within the service as well 
as the replacement of the appliances and 
equipment needed to implement the revised 
bulk foam plan.  This has involved significant 
market research including various foam 
concentrates and foam induction options 
and, due to the value of the contracts 
involved, is expected to involve a full 
European tendering process.
We have also liaised closely with the Health 
and Safety Executive (as a competent 
authority under the COMAH Regulations) to 
understand how the PSLG recommendations 
will translate into enforcement policy 
in terms of foam stocks provided and 
maintained by the operators themselves.  
This is clearly of significant interest to 
local authority FRSs as it may well affect 
how much they themselves hold.  However, 
it would appear that the bulk of the 
work in response to the BSTG and PSLG 
recommendations has, quite rightly, so 
far focused on the implementation of the 
preventative measures and the spotlight 
has not yet fallen on the recommended 
improvements relating to incident 
management.  That said, once a bulk 
foam attack is required the theoretical 
calculated risk of an event happening is 
of little consequence – as, by definition, 
an incident has already occurred and an 
effective emergency response needs to be 
implemented.  Therefore, the foam stocks and 
associated foam generation equipment which 
the competent authorities (CAs) require 
operators to hold – and against which the 
adequacy of their on-site emergency plans 
will partly be assessed – will be of significant 
interest.  For example:
•	Will the CAs really insist upon individual 
operators having the “... quantity of 
foam on site to cope with a fire in 
the largest bund immediately” as 
recommended by the PSLG report?
•	If not, how much will they be required 
to hold?
•	What will acceptable mutual aid look 
like, in terms of both quantities and 
timescales? and
•	How will the words “... ideally” and “... as 
far as is reasonably practicable” – both 
included in the PSLG and IP-19 reports 
– really affect the quantities of foam 
held by fuel storage sites and hence the 
joint ability of local authority FRSs and 
the operators to tackle large scale fuel 
storage fires in the future?
Time will tell, but given the experience of 
Buncefield it is certain that the UK as a 
whole can rightly expect an effective and 
efficient response to any future incidents 
requiring a bulk foam capability and there 
will be little sympathy if our planning and 
preparedness is found to be inadequate.
Conclusions
•	Prevention is clearly better than cure 
– but the ‘cure’ has to be ready if and 
when it is required.
•	Major foam attack plans must be based 
on realistic scenarios which have been 
thoroughly tested to ensure that they 
really do work in practice.
•	Effective partnerships and mutual 
aid schemes between industry and 
local authority  FRSs will undoubtedly 
continue to form a vital element of 
successful response capabilities.
•	The CAs will need to be very clear about 
how the PSLG recommendations will 
translate into COMAH enforcement 
policy to ensure that both operators and 
FRSs understand what may be expected 
from onsite firefighting resources and 
capabilities. 
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